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Abstract. Heisenberg introduced his famous uncertainty relations in a seminal
1927 paper entitled The Physical Content of Quantum Kinematics and
Mechanics. He motivated his arguments with a gedanken experiment, a gamma
ray microscope to measure the position of a particle. A primary result was
that, due to the quantum nature of light, there is an inherent uncertainty in
the determinations of the particle’s position and momentum dictated by an
indeterminacy relation, δqδp ∼ h. Heisenberg offered this demonstration as “a
direct physical interpretation of the [quantum mechanical] equation pq − qp =
−ih¯” but considered the indeterminacy relation to be much more than this. He
also argued that it implies limitations on the very meanings of position and
momentum and emphasized that these limitations are the source of the statistical
character of quantum mechanics. In addition, Heisenberg hoped but was unable
to demonstrate that the laws of quantum mechanics could be derived directly
from the uncertainty relation. In this paper, we revisit Heisenberg’s microscope
and argue that the Schro¨dinger equation for a free particle does indeed follow
from the indeterminacy relation together with reasonable statistical assumptions.
1. Introduction
The idea of fundamental uncertainty in nature was introduced by Werner
Heisenberg in his seminal 1927 paper entitled U¨ber den anschaulichen Inhalt der
quantentheoretischen Kinematik und Mechanik, translated by Wheeler and Zurek as
“The Physical Content of Quantum Kinematics and Mechanics” [Heisenberg 1927].
The German noun Anschaulichkeit and the adjective anschaulich connote visualization
or intuition through mechanical models [Miller 1986]. While Wheeler and Zurek
translate the German words “anschaulichen inhalt” as “physical content,” the
historian and philosopher of science Miller favors “intuitive contents” [Miller 1986,
Miller 1994]. Heisenberg’s biographer Cassidy prefers the expression “perceptual
content” instead [Cassidy 1992]. Thus there are various alternative ways of translating
the title of Heisenberg’s paper. Anschaulich seems to be “one of those German words
that defy an unambiguous translation” as Uffink has pointed out [Uffink 2002].
Heisenberg’s use of the word anschaulich was undoubtedly intended to answer
Schro¨dinger’s argument that his wave mechanics was more anschaulich than
Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics [Hilgevoord and Uffink 2016]. However, Heisenberg’s
paper turned out to be much more than a defense of the matrix mechanics formulation
of quantum mechanics. The very first sentence in his paper declares, “We believe
we understand the physical content of a theory when we can see its qualitative
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Another look through Heisenberg’s microscope 2
experimental consequences in all simple cases and when at the same time we have
checked that the application of the theory never contains inner contradictions”
[Heisenberg 1927]. He then proceeds, largely through the use of a simple gedanken
experiment, a γ-ray microscope, to give a simple physical interpretation of the abstract
quantum mechanical commutation relation, pq−qp = −ih¯. By the end of the paper,
he was able to conclude that “as we can think through qualitatively the experimental
consequences of the theory in all simple cases, we will no longer have to look at
quantum mechanics as unphysical and abstract” [Heisenberg 1927]. This was an
extraordinary claim about a theory that nearly all physicists, at the time, characterized
as unphysical and abstract.
In fact, soon after Heisenberg’s paper was received, there arose many questions of
clarification and outright objections to his conclusions. Most notably, Bohr criticized
several aspects of Heisenberg’s treatment even before the paper was published.
Curiously, Heisenberg included these criticisms at the end of his paper in an Addition
in Proof but did not address them in the body of the paper. While Bohr acknowledged
the importance of Heisenberg’s indeterminacy relations, he considered them to be an
aspect of his principle of complementarity, a principle Bohr considered to be at the
heart of quantum mechanics. In particular, he pointed out that Heisenberg’s analysis
of the γ-ray microscope presupposed complementarity (in this case, the wave/particle
duality of photons). He also pointed out a flaw in Heisenberg’s analysis of the
optics that, when corrected, did not change the conclusions. The importance of
complementarity was later stressed by Bohr [Bohr 1928], Heisenberg [Heisenberg 1930]
and Pauli [Pauli 1980]. This way of looking at the Heisenberg relations became the
standard view of the Copenhagen interpretation.
The modern consensus is that Heisenberg’s derivation is, at best, a heuristic
argument and the uncertainties that appear in the standard uncertainty principle
∆q∆p ≥ h¯/2, which follows immediately from the commutation relation for q
and p, have little to do with disturbance and measurement errors [Ballentine 1970,
Ballentine 1998, Brown and Redhead 1981]. Rather ∆q∆p ≥ h¯/2 simply expresses a
property of all quantum states. On the other hand, even this interpretation cannot be
divorced from the language of experiment. Systems must be prepared in quantum
states and state preparation necessarily involves the action of some experimental
apparatus. Furthermore the meaning of, for example, ∆q is the spread in the results of
the measurements of q for similarly prepared systems and this also involves the action
of an experimental apparatus. However, the uncertainty principle does not necessarily
restrict the accuracy with which q and p can be simultaneously measured; in fact, it
can be argued that quantum mechanics says nothing at all about the simultaneous
measurements of non-commuting observables [Ballentine 1970]
Nevertheless, the question of how to relate Heisenberg’s analysis to the formalism
of quantum mechanics has never been completely settled and discussions about
the meaning of and primacy of Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations have continued
unabated. These discussions often focus on one or more of the different expressions
of the uncertainty principle such as: restrictions on the accuracy of simultaneous
measurements of canonically conjugate quantities, e.g, p and q; restrictions on
the of the spread of individual measurements of conjugate quantities made on an
ensemble of similarly prepared systems; restrictions on the physical compatibility of
experimental arrangements for accurately measuring different observables; and the
inevitable disturbance of a system due to its interaction with a measuring device. We
will comment on some of these in Section 2. Heisenberg did not seem to distinguish
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among the above types of uncertainty in his paper nor did he offer a quantitative
definition of the uncertainties δq and δp themselves. It seems to us that this was
entirely in line with his intention of providing an anschaulich description of quantum
mechanics with the purpose of providing physical insight into the content of the
abstract formalism. This certainly seems to be the purpose of many authors of
introductory QM texts who include descriptions of Heisenberg’s γ-ray microscope.
The purpose of our present paper is to push Heisenberg’s argument further and
use his γ-ray microscope not just to provide “a direct physical interpretation” of
the quantum mechanical formalism but to show that his qualitative indeterminacy
relation, δqδp ∼ h, complemented with assumptions about the statistical analysis
of measurement, provides a direct route to the free particle Schro¨dinger equation
(see Section 3). Heisenberg considered the possibility of such a derivation in the
conclusions of his paper where he wrote “Of course we would also like to be able
to derive, if possible, the quantitative laws of quantum mechanics directly from the
physical foundations - that is, essentially, from relation (1) [δqδp ∼ h]” but then was
forced to conclude that “We believe, rather, for the time being that the quantitative
laws can be derived out of the physical foundations only by use of the principle of
maximum simplicity” [Heisenberg 1927]. Near the end of his paper, Heisenberg states
We have not assumed that quantum theory – in opposition to classical
theory – is an essentially statistical theory in the sense that only statistical
conclusions can be drawn from precise initial data... Even in principle we
cannot know the present in all detail. For that reason everything observed
is a selection from a plenitude of possibilities and a limitation on what is
possible in the future.
In his 1929 Chicago lectures, “The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory”
[Heisenberg 1930], he pointed out that
...the idea that natural phenomena obey exact laws – the principle of causality
(...) rests on the assumption that it is possible to observe the phenomena
without appreciably influencing them.
However, nature is quantized and
There exists no infinitesimals by the aid of which an observation might be
made without appreciable perturbation.
2. Heisenberg’s Microscope and the Indeterminacy Relations
Near the beginning of his paper, Heisenberg made use of a γ-ray microscope to
investigate the meaning of position and momentum of a particle in the context of
quantum mechanics. Since Einstein’s special theory of relativity, physicists have
learned to pay strict attention to the degree to which theoretical quantities can be
measured. Bohr emphasized this in his debates with Einstein and Heisenberg certainly
had this in mind when he wrote [Heisenberg 1927]
When one wants to be clear by what is to be understood by the words
“position of the object,” for example of the electron (relative to a given
frame of reference), then one must specify definite experiments with whose
help one plans to measure the “position of the electron”; otherwise, this word
has no meaning.
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Heisenberg then proceeds to introduce a γ-ray microscope with which one can
determine the position of an electron with arbitrary accuracy so long as the wavelength
of the γ-ray is small enough. In general, one can determine the position to an accuracy
on the order of the wavelength λ of the γ-ray, i.e., δq ∼ λ. However, in making
this measurement, the scattering of the γ-ray by the electron imparts a momentum
impulse to the electron proportional to the momentum of the γ-ray photon, which by
the Einstein relation is h/λ. If one considers this impulse as an unknown momentum
disturbance, then the uncertainty in the electron’s momentum is δp ∼ h/λ (assuming
the initial momentum of the electron is known precisely). Combining these two
relations one has
δqδp ∼ h (1)
Later in the paper he made the analogy with relativity explicit [Heisenberg 1927]:
It is natural in this respect to compare quantum theory with special relativity.
According to relativity, the word “simultaneous” cannot be defined except
through experiments in which the velocity of light enters in an essential
way. If there existed a “sharper” definition of simultaneity, as, for example,
signals which propagate infinitely fast, then relativity theory would be
impossible...We find a similar situation with the definition of the concepts of
“position of an electron” and “velocity” in quantum theory. All experiments
which we can use for the definition of these terms necessarily contain the
uncertainty implied by equation (1) [δqδp ∼ h]...
So, it seems, that Heisenberg considered the indeterminacy relation to be the result
of an empirical principle embodied in his γ-ray microscope in the same way that the
relativity of simultaneity was due to the empirical principle that the speed of light
was a universal constant. For Heisenberg Eq. 1, the first and most important relation
in his paper, imposes fundamental limitations on the very meaning of position and
momentum. He concludes that “...Even in principle we cannot know the present [state
of a system] in all detail.”
Heisenberg’s paper ends with a remarkable Addition in Proof in which he points
to a number of criticisms by Bohr. As Rosenfeld would later argue in his article on
the history of atomic theory [Rosenfeld 1971], Heisenberg
declared in substance that he had missed essential points, whose clarification
would be found in a forthcoming paper by Bohr. This addendum must have
puzzled many readers: it is not often that the announcement of a decisive
progress in our insight into the workings of nature is qualified by such a
warning.
Bohr, in a subsequent paper in Nature [Bohr 1928], would emphasize the primacy of
the Principle of Complementarity in interpreting Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations.
A year later Heisenberg, in his 1929 Chicago lectures [Heisenberg 1930], corrected
some technical errors (which however did not affect the conclusions of his 1927
paper) and acknowledged the importance of the complementary nature of wave
and particle descriptions. However, as Camilleri has emphasized, Heisenbergs’s
understanding of complementarity differed in some important respects from Bohr’s
view [Camilleri 2009]. The extent to which complementarity sets limits on
conjugate quantities has been clarified by Hall [Hall 2004], who succeeded in deriving
generally applicable uncertainty relations which quantify the limitations imposed by
complementarity on quantum systems.
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While there has never been complete agreement on just what the standard
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics entails [Stapp 1972, Howard 2004,
Camilleri 2009], Pauli’s 1958 article, “General Principles of Quantum Mechanics”
[Pauli 1980] in Handbuch der Physik might be taken as the “final” Copenhagen view
on the uncertainty principle. In his discussion, Pauli reproduced both the derivation
of Bohr (assuming wave/particle duality of photons) and the (corrected) derivation of
Heisenberg. (Pauli also considered the relativistic regime.) The uncertainty relation,
δqδp ∼ h, for photons follows directly from their wave nature. Photon-particle
scattering experiments then transfer this same relation to the position and momentum
of particles. To Pauli, the simplest interpretation of the latter is that particles also
possess wave-like properties such that λ = h/p. Ultimately, Pauli seems to give
comparable importance to the uncertainty principle and complementarity, e.g.,
The influence of the apparatus for measuring the momentum (position) of the
system is such that within the limits given by the uncertainty relationships
the possibility of using a knowledge of the earlier position (momentum)
for the prediction of the results of the later measurements of the position
(momentum) is lost. If, due to this, the use of a classical concept excludes
that of another, we call both concepts (e.g., position and momentum co-
ordinates of a particle) complementary (to each other), following Bohr. We
might call modern quantum theory as “The Theory of Complementarity” (in
analogy with the terminology “Theory of Relativity”).
A corrected simple model of Heisenberg’s microscope, which is the one that
invariably appears in introductory texts, is depicted in Fig. 1. For simplicity assume
that the γ-ray photon beam is initially along the axis of the lens. The angular
resolution of a lens of diameter D is δθ ≈ λ/D (or 1.22 λ/D according to the Rayleigh
criterion). This corresponds to a distance at the object of δq ≈ Fδθ ≈ λF/D where F
is the focal length of the lens. The photon that is (elastically) scattered into the lens
acquires a transverse component that is in the range of −pγ sinφ to +pγ sinφ where
pγ is the original momentum of the photon. For small angles, sinφ ≈ tanφ = D/2F .
Therefore, the uncertainty in the transverse component of the momentum of the
recoiling photon is pγ ≈ (D/F )pγ ≈ hD/λF . By conservation of momentum,
the uncertainty of the electron momentum becomes ≈ hD/λF . Multiplying the
expressions for δq and δp we obtain δqδp ∼ h, the same expression as in Eq. 1.
While this analysis would presumably have passed muster with Bohr, we suspect that
Heisenberg was satisfied with his original argument as he maintained that “one does
not need to complain that the basic equation (1) contains only qualitative predictions.”
He evidently thought such complaints were irrelevant to his argument.
One of the main goals of Heisenberg’s paper was to obtain “a direct physical
interpretation of the equation pq − qp = −ih¯.” To do this he constructed the
equivalent of a minimum uncertainty Gaussian wave packet for which the quantum
mechanical operators p and q have their usual meanings. His conclusion was that
for this particular quantum state, δqδp = h¯/2 if δq and δp are interpreted as rms
expectation values. Considering the qualitative nature of Eq. 1, Heisenberg then took
it to be a direct consequence of pq − qp = −ih¯, the commutation rule of quantum
formalism.
Just four months after Heisenberg’s paper, Kennard [Kennard 1927] proved that
for any normalized state,
∆q∆p ≥ h¯/2 (2)
Another look through Heisenberg’s microscope 6
Figure 1. Heisenberg microscope
where ∆q and ∆p are standard deviations, i.e., (∆q)2 ≡ ∫ Ψ∗q2Ψdq − [∫ Ψ∗qΨdq]2
and similarly for (∆p)2. This is the familiar standard expression for the uncertainty
principle. Robertson [Robertson 1929] and Schro¨dinger [Schro¨dinger 1930] generalized
this relation for any pair of observables but their more general expression reduces to
Eq. 2 for conjugate pairs [Ballentine 1970]. We note that in Heisenberg’s 1927 paper,
his indeterminacy relation is expressed as either an approximate equality or an equality
rather than an inequality as in Eq. 2.
There have been many, many analyses of the uncertainty relation since 1927. Most
of them take standard, usually nonrelativistic, quantum mechanics as their starting
point and go on to compute various expressions of uncertainties that may be derived
from the theoretical formalism. These analyses can provide deep insight into the
quantum formalism and its interpretation but for the most part they are not directly
relevant to the present paper, nor to Heisenberg’s original paper for that matter. It
was Heisenberg’s intent to derive a relation from an empirical principle, in this case
one governing the behavior of a γ-ray microscope, and then to compare this relation
with one derived from abstract quantum formalism thereby rendering a degree of
anschaulichkeit to quantum mechanics.
The properties of light and electrons that are used for Heisenberg’s analysis all
derive from experimental results. This supports the view that the indeterminacy
relation should be considered an empirical principle, even if it is unlikely that
Heisenberg’s analysis would have been carried out if not for the urgent need to clarify
the interpretation of quantum mechanics. The wave-like behavior of light had been
known since Thomas Young’s experiments in the 1790’s. The quantal nature of light
was known from the work of Planck and Poincare, the analysis of the photoelectric
effect by Einstein, and the scattering experiments of Compton. That electromagnetic
radiation causes pressure and therefore has momentum was known to Maxwell and
others well before special relativity [Maxwell 1891].
In the last few years, there have been conflicting claims regarding the question
of whether Heisenberg’s indeterminacy relation δqδp ∼ h is generally applicable; for
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discussions, see e.g. Refs. [Hilgevoord and Uffink 2016, Sen 2014, Rozema 2015]. The
validity of the uncertainty principle ∆q∆p ≥ h¯/2, which follows from the commutator
of q and p, is of course not questioned. But the validity of the relation δqδp ∼ h
depends on how one defines uncertainty and disturbance. The papers addressing this
controversy consider the problem of taking the rather vague concepts of uncertainty
and disturbance that Heisenberg used in his gedanken experiment and replacing them
by definitions that are precise and at the same time general enough to apply to a
wide class of measurements. Thus inequivalent measurement-disturbance relations can
be found in the literature [Ozawa 2003, Busch, Lahti and Werner 2013], as discussed
in Refs. [Hilgevoord and Uffink 2016, Sen 2014, Rozema 2015] and, not surprisingly,
these different definitions can lead to conclusions that are in disagreement. This is at
the moment an active area of research and it is still not clear which of the different
Heisenberg-type inequalities that follow from these different definitions will prove
useful in the analysis of experiments or for the development of new theoretical tools. In
all such studies, an effort is made to find reasonable mathematical expressions derived
from the quantum formalism that may be interpreted as measures of uncertainty and
disturbance and to look for inequalities which are satisfied by these expressions. Thus
the approach of these papers is in some sense a reversal of the procedure followed
by Heisenberg, who arrived at his indeterminacy relation after suggesting plausible
but imprecise definitions of uncertainty and disturbance for particular experiments.
It is for this reason that the conclusions of these studies are not directly relevant to
our paper, which takes Heisenberg’s heuristic approach as its starting point to derive
additional results. We are not as much interested in what standard quantum formalism
has to say about the uncertainty principle but rather in how Heisenberg’s empirical
principle points the way to quantum mechanics. It is to this topic that we now turn.
3. Schro¨dinger equation from the Heisenberg relations
Einstein, in his “Reply to Criticisms” in the volume “Albert Einstein: Philosopher-
Scientist” [Einstein 1949], makes reference to Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation in two
places. In the first comment, he writes that the correctness of the uncertainty relation
“is, from my own point of view, rightfully regarded as finally demonstrated.” Later on,
he refers to the “natural limits fixed by the indeterminacy relation” while discussing
“the very important progress which the statistical quantum theory has brought to
theoretical physics.” These two remarks on the uncertainty relation suggest that he
believed it should be taken as an empirical principle, especially given the fact that
much of what he writes about quantum mechanics in this essay consists of incisive
criticism of the standard interpretation of the theory.
As we mentioned above, Heisenberg had hoped his uncertainty relation would
serve as a foundation for quantum mechanics. It would have been possible, already
in the late 1920s, to fulfill his expectations; i.e., to show that the basic equations of
quantum mechanics follow from the empirical relation δqδp ∼ h. Such an argument
requires only the realization that the standard Hamilton-Jacobi formulation of classical
mechanics can serve as the basis for a theory of the motion of classical ensembles
[Landauer 1952, Hall and Reginatto 2016] and a familiarity with the foundations
of statistics. These tools are needed to define the uncertainties for position and
momentum, which remain vague in Heisenberg’s paper, in a more precise way.
Hall and Reginatto [Hall and Reginatto 2002a, Hall and Reginatto 2002b] have
already shown that it is possible to go from the Heisenberg uncertainty relation
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to the Schro¨dinger equation provided one introduces a more powerful exact
form of the uncertainty principle which postulates that the quantum system is
subject to momentum fluctuations with a strength that is inversely correlated
with the uncertainty in position. They argued that their approach offered
[Hall and Reginatto 2002a]
...a new way of viewing the uncertainty principle as the key concept in
quantum mechanics. While it is true that no one before quantum mechanics
would think of taking an uncertainty principle as a fundamental principle,
our analysis is valuable in that it enforces the importance of the uncertainty
principle in distinguishing quantum mechanics from classical mechanics – in
a sense, it says that the uncertainty principle is the fundamental element that
is needed for the transition to quantum mechanics.
While the approach presented in this paper is in some ways similar to that of Hall
and Reginatto [Hall and Reginatto 2002a, Hall and Reginatto 2002b], it is less formal
and perhaps more empirically motivated in the sense that it takes as its starting
point the particular type of measurement considered by Heisenberg. To carry out our
approach, we will first introduce uncertainties for position and momentum using an
operational point of view. Then a physically motivated jump to the Schro¨dinger
equation will be made. This requires introducing an additional assumption that
effectively amounts to postulating a quantization procedure.
3.1. The uncertainty in position
In his discussion of uncertainty in position, Heisenberg does not define precisely what
he means. He simply writes (using our notation) “Let [δq] be the precision with which
the value [q] is known ([δq] is, say, the mean error of [q])” and then proceeds with
the analysis. Here instead we pay close attention to some technical aspects of the
measurement of position and derive a precise definition of δq.
Consider an experiment in which the measurand (i.e., the quantity to be
measured) is the position of the particle. We introduce a model relating the value
of the measurand q˜ to the estimated value qk that results from a given measurement
by setting
qk = q˜ + k, (3)
where the subscript k = 1, ..., N labels a particular measurement out of a set of N
measurements (that is, we allow for the possibility of repeating the measurement
N times) and k is the discrepancy between the value of the measurand q˜ and the
estimated value qk. Thus the result of the experiment will be a series of numbers,
(q1, q2, ..., qN ), and from this series of numbers the experimentalist will estimate the
position of the particle. This requires a mathematical model of the analysis of the
measurement data. More formally, we assume that there is some probability density
P which describes the probability of measuring qk and treat the measurement qk as
if it was a sample from this distribution. Since qk is a location parameter, it will be
natural to assume that the probability density is of the form P = P (q− q˜, λa), where
the λa, a = 1, ..., n, are any additional parameters which are needed to fully describe
the probability density. For example, P might be the Gaussian
P =
1√
2piσ
e−
1
2 (
q−q˜
σ )
2
, (4)
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in which case there is only one additional parameter λ1, which corresponds to the
standard deviation, λ1 = σ. One may, of course, consider more complicated densities
which depend on multiple parameters.
The particle’s position can be estimated from the data by means of an “estimator”
or “point estimate,” which is a statistic (that is, a function f(qk) of the data {qk})
used to infer the value of the measurand q˜ that enters into the statistical model. There
are of course many different possible estimators, some better, some worse. For the
analysis of the γ-ray microscope, let us assume that the following two conditions are
required:
(i) As the Heisenberg uncertainty relation is assumed to hold only for the case of an
optimal experiment (i.e., a cleverly designed experiment and the best available
data analysis), the estimator used should be the one that has the lowest possible
variance,
(ii) the estimator should be an unbiased estimator, that is, the mean of the sampling
distribution of the statistic should be equal to the parameter being estimated.
While the second condition seems natural, one should be aware that there is an
element of arbitrariness in the criterion of being unbiased [Silvey 1970, Jaynes 2004,
von der Linden 2014]. It is introduced here for technical reasons: it is possible to
establish a lower bound for the variance of an unbiased estimator but there is no
analogous proof for the general case [Silvey 1970, von der Linden 2014]. Furthermore,
one can argue that this condition is not unreasonable in the context of a repeatable
experiment which may be carried out a large number of times.
These assumptions are all that we need for a precise definition of δq. It can be
shown that all unbiased estimators satisfy the Crame´r-Rao inequality [Bulmer 1979],
var(f) ≥
{∫
dq P
(
1
P
∂P
∂q˜
)2}−1
. (5)
where var(f) denotes the variance of the estimator f . The proof requires a mild
regularity condition which allows reversing the order of integration with respect to
q and differentiation with respect to q˜ [Bulmer 1979] and we assume here that this
condition holds. Because P = P (q− q˜, λ), we have
(
∂P
∂q˜
)2
=
(
∂P
∂q
)2
and the inequality
can be written in the equivalent form
var(f) ≥
{∫
dq P
(
1
P
∂P
∂q
)2}−1
. (6)
Assume that q˜ is estimated from the data using the best possible estimator, which
we take to mean the unbiased estimator that has the lowest variance, and that this
estimator achieves the Crame´r-Rao lower bound (i.e., it is an ‘efficient estimator’).
Then,
(δq)2 =
{∫
dq P
(
1
P
∂P
∂q
)2}−1
. (7)
We take this particular expression for δq and use it to define the uncertainty of any
optimal determination of position, including the one considered by Heisenberg in his
gedanken experiment. The expression in curly brackets on the right hand side of Eq.
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(7) is the Fisher information [Fisher 1925] associated with translations of q. For this
reason, δq is also known as the the Fisher length [Hall 2000].
As an illustration, consider again a Gaussian distribution. Both the mean and
the median are examples of unbiased estimators. But in the case of large samples
the variance of the mean is smaller than the variance of the median [Bulmer 1979],
thus the mean would be considered a better estimator. How does the mean compare
to other estimators? It is straightforward to show that for a Gaussian distribution,
the Crame´r-Rao lower bound is achieved by the sample mean. Thus it has the lowest
possible variance of all unbiased estimators.‡
More generally, if an efficient unbiased estimator exists, it will be the maximum
likelihood estimator [von der Linden 2014]. The expression given by Eq. (7) is
therefore closely connected to maximum likelihood estimation.
3.2. The uncertainty in momentum
The experiment considered by Heisenberg is one that measures the location of a
particle, thus position plays a fundamental role. Based on the assumption of an
optimal measurement, we have defined the uncertainty in position via Eq. (7). As far
as the measurement is concerned, there is an obvious asymmetry between position and
momentum, as Hilgevoord and Uffink [Hilgevoord and Uffink 1990] have emphasized,
Note that only one measurement is actually performed: the determination of
the photon’s position. From the result of this measurement a prediction can
be made about the outcome of subsequent measurements of the photon’s (or
electron’s) momentum. No simultaneous measurements are involved! Neither
are joint probabilities, nor is the projection postulate.
Thus the uncertainty in momentum must be handled differently than the uncertainty
in position. As there is no measurement of momentum, the uncertainty in momentum
cannot be estimated experimentally. Heisenberg writes (using our notation) “Let
[δp] be the precision with which the value [p] is determinable; that is, here, the
discontinuous change of p in the Compton effect.” But this is not sufficient for our
purposes. We consider a definition of momentum uncertainty which is both more
general and more precise. We will proceed in two steps. We will first consider the
case of a classical particle, for which there is a natural and straightforward definition
of momentum uncertainty. Afterward, we will look for an appropriate definition of
momentum uncertainty that is valid for the quantum case.
3.2.1. Momentum uncertainty for the classical case In the previous section we defined
the uncertainty in position q by means of a probability density defined over the
configuration space of the particle (i.e., Euclidean three-dimensional space). If the
particle is in motion, the probability density associated with the location of the particle
will also be in motion. Since momentum is associated with velocity, it is clear that we
need to consider the dynamics of this probability density. There is one fundamental
requirement: the probability density P = P (q, t) introduced in the previous section
‡ Of course, in the present case, we are not suggesting that the mean of a series of measurements of
position be considered as the best estimator, but rather, a single optimal measurement of the type
suggested by Heisenberg’s microscope.
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must satisfy a continuity equation, otherwise probability is not conserved. Such an
equation is of the form
P˙ +
∂(Pv)
∂q
= 0 (8)
where v = v(q, t) is the velocity field associated with the motion of P .
To specify the motion of P , we need an equation for the velocity field v. We
consider first a classical particle, and later we will look at the modifications that are
needed for a quantum particle. In the case of a classical particle, one may define v
with the help of the Hamilton-Jacobi formalism, in which case
v =
1
m
∂S
∂q
(9)
where S = S(q, t) satisfies the the Hamilton-Jacobi equation
S˙ +
1
2m
(
∂S
∂q
)2
+ V = 0, (10)
with a potential term V . It is straightforward to express the average energy < E >
associated with the ensemble of classical particles; i.e.,
< E >=
∫
dq P
[
1
2m
(
∂S
∂q
)2
+ V
]
. (11)
As an aside, notice that it is not strictly necessary to postulate Eq. (9) because v
follows from the equations of motion for P and S whenever P is highly localized
(i.e., a delta function). Thus v is operationally well defined [Hall and Reginatto 2005,
Hall and Reginatto 2016]. If P is not localized then P∂S/∂q can be thought of as
momentum density associated with P .
It will be useful for the analysis of the next section to restrict the formulation to
the specific case of interest. Since the gedanken experiment involves a free particle
immediately before and after the collision, we are interested in the case in which the
potential term is set to zero. From Eq. (11), the average energy for the case V = 0 is
given by
HC =
∫
dq P
[
1
2m
(
∂S
∂q
)2]
. (12)
We will see in the next Section that HC plays the role of a classical Hamiltonian;
i.e., the Hamiltonian that determines the equation of motion for the ensemble of free
classical particles.
Now we can define the uncertainty in the momentum pC of a classical particle in
the usual way via the variance,
(δpC)
2 = var(pC) =
{∫
dq P
(
∂S
∂q
)2}
−
{∫
dq P
(
∂S
∂q
)}2
, (13)
where we use Eq. (9) to express the momentum in terms of ∂S∂q . Notice that var(pC)
and HC are related by the equation
var(pC) =< (pC)
2 > − < pC >2= 2mHC− < pC >2 . (14)
This observation will be useful in the next section.
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What changes do we have to make to this formulae when we have a quantum
particle? Clearly the expression for (δpC)
2, Eq. (13), can no longer be valid
because it is inconsistent with the Heisenberg uncertainty relation. While Eq. (8),
the continuity equation, must be satisfied to ensure conservation of probability, the
classical Hamilton-Jacobi equation, Eq. (10), certainly cannot be applied to quantum
phenomena. Both of these inadequacies can be corrected by adding a quantum term
to the classical Hamiltonian, a task to which we now turn.
3.2.2. Momentum uncertainty for the quantum case The previous steps did not
require anything particularly out of the ordinary. The uncertainty in position δq
was defined using tools of statistics developed in the 1920s for precisely such types of
measurement. The uncertainty in momentum δpC of the classical particle was defined
by means of Hamilton-Jacobi theory and some basic concepts from probability theory.
The next step of jumping to the Schro¨dinger equation requires more creativity.
Heisenberg’s analysis leads to the semiquantitative expression δq δp ∼ h, which
should be valid for the case of an optimal measurement carried out on a quantum
particle if the experiments are to be consistent with the claim that this relation
represents a fundamental limit. We rewrite this as the equality
δq δpH =
h
η
, (15)
where η > 0 is a dimensionless constant which Heisenberg did not bother to determine
and the subscript H in δpH is there to remind us that this is the uncertainty in
momentum that appears in Heisenberg’s indeterminacy relation, Eq. (1). Eq. (15)
can be written in the equivalent form
(δpH)
2 =
h2
η2
1
(δq)2
=
h2
η2
∫
dq P
(
1
P
∂P
∂q
)2
, (16)
where we used Eq. (7) in the last equality. Furthermore, since Heisenberg considers a
“best case” scenario, the product δqδp will typically be greater than hη . So we replace
Heisenberg’s relation by the inequality
δq δpQ ≥ h
η
, (17)
which presumably is valid for any measurements performed on a quantum particle.
The symbol δpQ represents the variance in subsequent measurements of the momentum
of the quantum particle. This may seem somewhat removed of the δp in Heisenberg’s
indeterminacy relation, which represented a disturbance of the momentum caused
by the γ-ray microscope. However, one can certainly claim that this disturbance
is equivalent to the uncertainty in any subsequent measurement of the particle’s
momentum. In this sense, it is reasonable to consider the use of the γ-ray microscope
to be a procedure of state preparation going forward. Heisenberg seemed to make no
distinction between these two interpretations of δp.
We would like to find a reasonable expression for δpQ which involves δpC and
δpH , the only two other uncertainties that we have at our disposal. In the optimal
quantum limit δpQ → δpH , while in the classical limit δpQ → δpC . The simplest way
to agree with these two limits is to define (δpQ)
2 as the sum of (δpC)
2 and (δpH)
2;
i.e., δpQ is obtained by summing δpC and δpH in quadrature. While this step has no
rigorous justification, it is consistent with the standard propagation of uncorrelated
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errors, a statistical procedure for data analysis that dates back to Gauss. With this
assumption,
(δpQ)
2 = (δpC)
2 + (δpH)
2
=
∫
dq P
(
∂S
∂q
)2
−
[∫
dq P
(
∂S
∂q
)]2
+
h2
η2
∫
dq P
(
1
P
∂P
∂q
)2
=
{∫
dq P
[(
∂S
∂q
)2
+
h2
η2
(
1
P
∂P
∂q
)2]}
−
{∫
dq P
(
∂S
∂q
)}2
. (18)
We now set var(pQ) = (δpQ)
2. This is the expression for var(pQ) that ought to replace
the classical variance var(pC) for the case of a quantum particle. We now look at the
consequences of defining var(pQ) in terms of the (δpQ)
2 of Eq. (18).
3.3. From the Heisenberg uncertainty relation to the Schro¨dinger equation
From Eq. (14), var(pC) = 2mHC− < pC >2. If we assume a similar functional form
for var(pQ) we are led to a quantum Hamiltonian equal to the first term in square
brackets of the last equality of Eq. (18) divided by 2m,
HQ =
∫
dq P
[
1
2m
(
∂S
∂q
)2
+
h2
2mη2
1
P 2
(
∂P
∂q
)2]
. (19)
This expression forHQ replaces the classical HamiltonianHC for the case of a quantum
particle. Eq. (14) results from identifying the classical Hamiltonian with the kinetic
energy of a free particle. If one takes into account the increased quantum dispersion
implied by the uncertainty relation, it is clear that the effective kinetic energy of a
quantum particle is the classical expression plus the dispersion of Eq. (16) divided
by 2m. Equating this effective kinetic energy with the quantum Hamiltonian leads to
and provides further justification for Eq. (19).
Now comes a crucial observation: it is straightforward to show that the two
equations that describe the ensemble for a classical particle, Eq. (8) and Eq. (10),
can be derived using a Hamiltonian formalism if we take P and S as canonically
conjugate field variables and define rate equations in the usual way,
P˙ = {P,HC} = −∂(Pv)
∂q
, (20)
S˙ = {S,HC} = − 1
2m
(
∂S
∂q
)2
, (21)
where {F,G} denotes the Poisson bracket of F and G. We will now assume that the
equations that describe the ensemble for a quantum particle will follow in an analogous
way, but with HC replaced by HQ.
The equations that follow from the Hamiltonian HQ are the continuity equation,
Eq. (8), and the modified Hamilton-Jacobi equation,
S˙ +
1
2m
(
∂S
∂q
)2
+
4h2
2mη2
1√
P
∂2
√
P
∂q2
= 0. (22)
This equation replaces the classical Hamilton-Jacobi equation for the case of a
quantum particle. As expected, when η →∞ Eq. (22) becomes the classical Hamilton-
Jacobi equation.
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At this point, η, is still a free parameter, one that Heisenberg left undefined. In
principle, it could be determined experimentally. One might attempt to determine
the value of η by a more careful analysis of Heisenberg’s microscope experiment or
by considering another more optimal arrangement. However, this would certainly
go beyond Heisenberg’s motive; he intentionally left the symbol ‘∼’ in his relation,
δqδp ∼ h. Alternatively, one could leave η as an unknown factor and then compare the
results of subsequent calculations with known phenomena such as atomic spectra. This
would inevitably result in determining η to be 4pi. If we set η = 4pi, Eq. (8) and Eq.
(22) are precisely the Schro¨dinger equation written in the formulation that Madelung
introduced in 1926 [Madelung 1927]. The complex Madelung transformation, ψ =√
PeiS/h¯, maps these two real equations to the free particle Schro¨dinger equation in
its usual form,
ih¯ψ˙ = − h¯
2
2m
∂2ψ
∂q2
. (23)
In this way, we have outlined a path from the Heisenberg uncertainty relation
to the Schro¨dinger equation for a free particle and, perhaps, fulfilled Heisenberg’s
wish “...to be able to derive, if possible, the quantitative laws of quantum mechanics
directly from the physical foundations - that is, essentially, from δqδp ∼ h.”
A claim to have derived the Schro¨dinger equation would be a bit of an
overstatement considering the assumptions made above, especially the momentum
variance of Eq. 18. The choice for the quantum Hamiltonian in Eq. 19
seems less worrisome given that the freedom to choose appropriate Hamiltonians
is often exercised. Even so, we find the self-consistency of our approach
convincing. For example, the substitution of the Madelung expression for ψ in the
standard quantum mechanical expression for momentum variance,
∫
dq ψ∗( h¯i
∂
∂q )
2ψ −[∫
dq ψ∗ h¯i
∂
∂qψ
]2
, yields precisely the variance in Eq. 18. Again using the Madelung
transformation but going in the other direction, the Hamilton-Jacobi expression
for the average momentum, 〈p〉 = ∫ dq P ∂S∂q implies the quantum mechanical
expression 〈p〉 = ∫ dq ψ∗ h¯i ∂∂qψ. Another example is the quantum mechanical minimum
uncertainty (Gaussian) wave packet. Again from the Madelung transformation, it’s
straightforward to show that the equivalent Hamilton-Jacobi probability density for
such a packet is e
−q2/2σ2√
piσ2
, in which case the variance of q is δq2 = σ
2
2 , the lower bound
of the Crame´r-Rao inequality of Eq, (7), while the momentum variance of Eq. (18) for
such a packet is δp2 = h¯
2
2σ2 , resulting in δqδp =
h¯
2 , our assumed minimum Heisenberg
uncertainty.
4. Discussion
The analysis of Section 3 maps out a direct path from Heisenberg’s indeterminacy
relation to the formalism of quantum mechanics as embodied in the Schro¨dinger
equation. Because the analysis was framed in terms of probabilities, the statistical
interpretation is automatic and there is no need to introduce the Born Rule for
interpreting the wave function Ψ. As such, it provides support for Heisenberg’s
conclusion (as stated in the abstract of his 1927 paper), i.e., “This indeterminacy
is the real basis for the occurrence of statistical relations in quantum mechanics.”
Our analysis also appears to fulfill, in part, Heisenberg’s desire to derive the laws of
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quantum mechanics from his indeterminacy relation, δqδp ∼ h. The endpoint of our
analysis, the Schro¨dinger equation for a free particle, automatically includes the wave
behavior of matter with no additional assumptions.
It is instructive to review how this happens. Heisenberg shows us that there
are inevitably uncertainties δq and δp associated with the position and momentum
of a particle. Once the uncertainty in position is accepted as a fundamental aspect
of the theory, it is natural to describe the position of the particle by a probability
density P that is mathematically a field over configuration space. Since the particle
moves, P will have to change with time, and since there is no reason why it should
move in a rigid fashion, there has to be a second field, a velocity vector field ~v, which
describes how the probability P changes in time. As we have shown in section 3,
the classical limit (in the form of the Hamilton-Jacobi formalism) suggests that the
velocity field can be derived from a single scalar field S according to m~v = ∇S. Thus
the motion of the particle is conveniently described in terms of two fields, P and
S, as a consequence of the indeterminacy postulated by Heisenberg. The derivation
of the Schro¨dinger equation from this insight is of course not a trivial exercise, as
is apparent from the analysis of section 3, but it can be carried out. Heisenberg
introduced his γ-ray microscope to investigate the very meanings of position and
momentum of a particle. He maintained that these concepts only derive meaning
by virtue of experiments with which they are to be measured. The result of his
deliberations was the indeterminacy relation, δqδp ∼ h. It should be emphasized that
this relation is quite distinct from the Kennard/Robertson/Schro¨dinger uncertainty
principle, ∆q∆p ≥ h¯/2. The latter is derived directly from the formalism of quantum
mechanics and is a statement about the properties of quantum states. The quantum
states themselves can be associated with hypothetical measurements only via the
Born rule and interpretative statements relating quantum operators and the outcome
of these measurements, the descriptions of which are usually vague and lie outside
the formalism of quantum mechanics. Heisenberg’s indeterminacy relation, on the
other hand, is a statement about the very meanings of q and p as derived from our
ability to determine them using an ideal measuring apparatus. It is in this sense that
δqδp ∼ h is an empirical principle of nature. It is remarkable that the definition of
δq that is needed to go from the Heisenberg uncertainty relation to the Schro¨dinger
equation, Eq. (7), is associated with maximum likelihood estimation. This suggests a
non-trivial connection between the Schro¨dinger equation and classical statistics which
should be explored further.
Since the early days of quantum mechanics there have been many discussions as
to how the theory should be interpreted. It seems likely that these questions arise
in part as a consequence of adopting the formalism of quantum mechanics, e.g., the
Schro¨dinger equation, as primal. One is then left with the problem of identifying
the theoretical constructs, the wave functions or quantum state vectors, with aspects
of reality. On the other hand, if one considers Heisenberg’s empirical indeterminacy
relations as primal, such questions do not immediately arise. Then the formalism of
quantum mechanics and concomitant wave functions become simply tools for making
predictions.
In his 1927 paper, Heisenberg maintained that the statistical nature of quantum
mechanics arises from the indeterminacy relations. It should be noted that our analysis
in Section 3 also treated classical physics as probabilistic. That statistics is important
to classical physics is not particularly novel; however, classical indeterminacy is usually
relegated to the behavior of large numbers of particles (statistical mechanics) or simply
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labeled as experimental noise and then summarily dismissed as a fundamental aspect
of nature. This doesn’t have to be the case, as indicated by the analysis of Section 3. So
if it’s not its statistical nature that distinguishes quantum from classical mechanics,
what does? It is generally accepted that there is no classical analog of the wave
nature of particles nor of the concomitant quantum interference. We have shown that
the Schro¨dinger equation, which provides a wave description, can be derived from
Heisenberg’s indeterminacy relations. The implication seems to be that it is primarily
the quantal nature of the world that leads to quantum interference and so distinguishes
quantum from classical mechanics.
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, even in its expression as an inequality,
is generally acknowledged as describing an underlying property of all quantum
mechanical systems. Even so, there are conflicting claims as to its fundamental
importance as well as to its general applicability. We have here endeavored to argue
that the uncertainty relation is of primal importance to the foundations of quantum
mechanics, a view that is certainly expressed by Heisenberg in his 1927 seminal paper.
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